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that it is not necessary to furnish the minutes of the voir dire in
78 1
order to obtain relief on appeal under Batson.

In conclusion, by failing to meet the second prong of the
Batson test, the defendant did not establish a prima facie showing
of racial discrimination in the prosecution's use of peremptory

challenges. Therefore, defendant's equal protection rights under
both the New York State and Federal Constitutions had not been
violated.
782

People v. Walker
(decided October 12, 1993)

Defendant claimed that his right to equal protection pursuant to
the State7 83 and Federal7 84 Constitutions was violated because
contrary, their backgrounds and knowledge of the case suggested that any bias
they might have would favor the prosecution").
781. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d at 268, 614 N.E.2d at 712, 598 N.Y.S.2d at
149. As the court explained:
[I]n order to give the trial court a proper foundation to evaluate the
claim - as well as to ensure an adequate record for appellate review a party asserting a claim under Batson v. Kentucky... should articulate
and develop all of the grounds supporting the claim, both factual and
legal, during the colloquy in which the objection is raised and
discussed .... Despite the absence of voir dire minutes, a trial or
appellate court may determine, based on facts elicited during the Batson
colloquy, whether a prima facie case of discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges has been established ....
Id. (citations omitted).
782. 81 N.Y.2d 661, 623 N.E.2d 1, 603 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1993).
783. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Section 11 states:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color,
creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights
by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by
the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.
Id.
784. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 states in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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New York's second felony offender statute 785 treats in-state and
out-of-state felonies differently when establishing a predicate
felony offense for purposes of sentence enhancement. 786 The
New York Court of Appeals held that the statute did not violate
equal protection because the distinction drawn between the
categories was "rationally related" to the "legitimate state
787
purpose" of enforcing the State's Penal Law.

In February 1984, defendant Walker was convicted of grand
larceny in the third degree, a class E felony for the theft of a
radio worth more than $250 but less than $1000 and was
sentenced under former Penal Law section 155.30[1].788
Subsequently, "the statute was amended to increase the minimum
value to $1000," and thus absent aggravating circumstances, a
theft of property worth less than $1000, "became petit larceny, a
789
class A misdemeanor."
Subsequently, in 1990, Walker was indicted on charges of
felony drug possession. 79 0 Following a conviction, the trial court

refused to sentence him as a second felony offender because "the
conduct for which he was sentenced as a felon in 1984 would
constitute only a misdemeanor under existing law." 7 91 The

Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed the lower
court's decision and "remitted for resentencing as a second
Id.
785. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06 (McKinney 1987). In determining whether
a prior conviction can serve as a "predicate felony conviction," § 70.06
provides in pertinent part:
(i) The conviction must have been in this state of a felony, or in any
other jurisdiction of an offense for which a sentence to a term of
imprisonment in excess of one year or a sentence of death was
authorized and is authorized in this state irrespective of whether such
sentence was imposed;
Id.
786. Walker, 81 N.Y.2d at 665, 623 N.E.2d at 4, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
787. Id. at 668-69, 623 N.E.2d at 5-6, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
788. Id. at 663, 623 N.E.2d at 2-3, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 281-82. The Penal
Law at that time treated theft of property valued greater than $250 as a class E
felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.30[1] (McKinney 1988).
789. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.25 (McKinney 1988).
790. Walker, 81 N.Y.2d at 663, 623 N.E.2d at 3, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
791. Id.
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felony offender" reasoning that Walker's prior felony conviction
was final before the amendment was effective. 792 Based on a

grant for leave, defendant appealed urging that his prior
conviction should not be viewed as a felony for purposes of
sentencing because "(1) the language of the second felony
offender statute, read with the definition of felony, 793 (2)
doctrine of amelioration, 794 and (3) equal protection
principles."

795

As to the equal protection claim, the court of appeals affirmed
the appellate division, holding that the statute did not violate
equal protection which requires that similarly situated persons are
treated similarly unless there is valid basis for distinguishing
between them. 796 Since the statute provided a rational basis for
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state felonies, the

792. Id.
793. Id. at 664, 623 N.E.2d at 3, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 282. After an
examination of unambiguous statutory language and legislative purpose, the
court of appeals rejected defendant's attempt to incorporate the "general
definition of 'felony'" into the "specific definition of second felony offender."
Id. at 665, 623 N.E.2d at 3-4, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 282. Rather, the court
determined, one should "look to the time of the prior crime - and the law at
that time - when considering whether the prior crime is a predicate felony for
second felony offender purposes." Id. at 665, 623 N.E.2d at 4, 603 N.Y.S.2d
283.
794. Id. at 664, 623 N.E.2d at 3, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 282. The court also
rejected defendant's contention that the amelioration doctrine should apply to
his 1984 felony offense. Id. at 667, 623 N.E.2d at 5, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
The amelioration doctrine provides that "[w]hen, between the time a person
commits a criminal act and the time of sentencing, a criminal statute is
repealed or a penalty reduced because of a changed view regarding the gravity
of the crime ....

the punishment standard at the time of sentencing should

guide the sentence." Id. at 666, 623 N.E.2d at 5, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 283-84.
The court stated that although the statute was "ameliorative in nature," the
doctrine will not reconsider defendant's final judgment under the subsequent
amendment because it was properly decided under criminal law at the time of
the proceeding against him. Id. at 667, 623 N.E.2d at 5, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
795. Id. at 664, 623 N.E.2d at 3, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 282.
796. People v. Cortlandt Medical Bldg. Assoc., 153 Misc. 2d 692, 694,
582 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (Town Ct. Westchester County 1992).
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court concluded that defendant's right to equal protection of the
797
laws was not violated.
When analyzing equal protection rights in areas of economic
and social welfare, New York State courts utilize a rational
relationship test. 798 To survive constitutional scrutiny, the
rational relation test requires that a legislative classification have
a reasonable basis that is rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose. 799 This test pays deference to the legislature which is
"presumed to know all the facts" needed to support the
800
constitutionality of the statute.
797. Walker, 81 N.Y.2d at 668-69, 623 N.E.2d at 5-6, 603 N.Y.S.2d at
285.
798. See, e.g., People v. Drayton, 39 N.Y.2d 580, 585, 350 N.E.2d 377,
379, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1976) (finding a rational basis for differentiating
between youths based upon "gravity of crime charged" when determining
youthful offender status); People v. Parker, 41 N.Y.2d 21, 25, 359 N.E.2d
348, 350, 390 N.Y.S.2d 837, 840 (1976). The court of appeals imposed
second felony offender status upon persons convicted of prior out-of-state
felonies where there was a rational relation to the "valid governmental aim of
treating habitual offenders more severely than first time offenders." Id.;
Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 62, 340 N.E.2d 444, 457, 378
N.Y.S.2d 1, 19 (1975) (upholding state's no-fault insurance plan as rationally
related to the legislative purpose of reducing insurance costs); Cortlandt
Medical Bldg. Assoc., 153 Misc. 2d at 694, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 641 (striking
down town code that failed to provide a rational basis for charging higher fre
for commercial false alarms than for residential ones).
799. Maresca v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 475 N.E.2d 95, 485 N.Y.S.2d
724 (1984); People v. Drayton, 39 N.Y.2d 580, 350 N.E.2d 377, 385
N.Y.S.2d 1, (1976); People v. Parker, 41 N.Y.2d 21, 359 N.E.2d 348, 39
N.Y.S.2d 837 (1976); Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d
444, 378 N.Y.S.2d'I (1975).
800. Walker, 81 N.Y.2d at 668, 623 N.E.2d at 6, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 285;
Maresca, at 250, 475 N.E.2d at 98, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 727. The court in
Maresca, explained that legislative enactments are deemed constitutional
because they are presumed to be based upon facts known to legislature. Id.
Although this presumption is rebuttable, the court cautioned that "it is only as
a last resort that courts strike down legislative enactments on the ground of
unconstitutionality." Id. at 250, 475 N.E.2d at 98-99, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
Therefore, even if the court must "hypothesize the motivations of the State
Legislature" almost any statute will be constitutional if it can find the
classification scheme is based upon "some conceivable and legitimate State
interest." Id. at 250-51, 475 N.E.2d at 98-99, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 727-28.
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In reaching its conclusion the court in Walker, relied upon the
reasoning of three concurring judges in People v. Pacheco,80 1 a
New York Court of Appeals case, challenging the same penal law
and the same legislative classification as the instant case. 802 The
judges reasoned that the state has a legitimate interest in
enforcing its own criminal statutes and it is "not unreasonable" to
provide that an individual "who violated this [s]tate's felony laws
once should suffer heightened punishment if he commits a second
felony in New York since such a person has demonstrated a
repeated disregard for the [s]tate's most serious criminal
prohibitions . . . "803 The Walker court found this reasoning
persuasive and held "the distinction drawn by section 70.06

(1)(b)(i) [was] therefore rationally related to the legitimate [s]tate
purpose of enforcing New York's criminal laws."804
Similarly, when challenging social or economic enactments

made by Congress, federal equal protection principles require

that the classification scheme has "some reasonable basis." 805 So
long as the means used by the legislature are rationally related to

801. 53 N.Y.2d 663, 421 N.E.2d 114, 438 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1981) (Cooke,
J., concurring). Chief Judge Cooke filed opinion in which Judges Gabrielli and
Fuchsberg joined. Id. at 666-70, 421 N.E.2d at 115-17, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 99597 (Cooke, J., concurring).
802. Id. at 665, 421 N.E.2d at 115, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 995. The majority
never addressed the equal protection challenge because the defendant lacked
standing to raise the argument. Id. at 666, 421 N.E.2d at 115, 438 N.Y.S.2d
at 995. The three concurring justices, however, would have reached the issue
and upheld the statute under rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 669, 421 N.E.2d at
117, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 997 (Cooke, J., concurring).
803. Id.
804. Walker, 81 N.Y.2d at 668-69, 623 N.E.2d at 6, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
805. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
177 (1980) (insuring "solvency of the railroad retirement system and protecting
vested benefits" was a reasonable basis for eliminating "windfall benefits" for
some railroad employees and not others based upon date of employment); But
see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 879 (1985) (promoting
in-state insurance companies at the expense of out-of-state competitors was not
a legitimate state interest).
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the legitimate legislative purpose, the statute will survive
806
constitutional muster.

In areas of economic and social welfare legislation, both State
and Federal Constitutions require equal treatment for similarly
situated individuals unless the government can demonstrate a
rational basis for imposing disparate treatment.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
Chin v. Board of Elections 807
(decided June 29, 1993)

Petitioner claimed that the failure of New York City to provide
language translation assistance to Asian voters at a primary
election violated the State8 0 8 and Federal 8 0 9 Equal Protection

Clauses. 810 The Appellate Division, First Department, held that
there was no constitutional violation because the Federal Voting

806. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
461-62 (1981). The United States Supreme Court found discrimination between
"plastic and nonplastic nonreturnable milk containers" was rationally related to
state's legitimate interests in "promoting resource conservation, easing solid
waste disposal problems, and conserving energy .... " Id.; City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1976) (excluding street vendors who
had worked less than eight years was rationally related to state objective of
preserving the custom and appearance of the French Quarter); but see Logan
v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 439-42 (1982) (treating differently
employment discrimination claims processed within 120 days and those
processed after, could not rationally achieve the state objective of "expediting"
disputes).
807. 194 A.D.2d 480, 599 N.Y.S.2d 569 (lst Dep't 1993).
808. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. This provision provides: "No person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision
thereof." Id.
809. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 3. This provision provides: "No
state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." Id.
810. Chin, 194 A.D.2d at 481, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
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